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Schmidt at the Institute for their valuable assistance in writing the paper.I. Introduction,
This paper examines the present system of resource allocation
in North Korea and analyzes some of the economic issues that will
follow unification of North and South Korea. Korean unification, if
and when it takes place, will entail two separate, but related
economic problems—transforming the centrally planned socialist
economy in North Korea into a market economy and integrating it
with the market economy of the south.
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The transformation of the North Korean economy will require
the-establishment of private ownership and market institutions. The
union of the two economies will entail such difficult problems as
determining the conversion rate between the North Korean won and
the South Korean won and taking measures to prevent massive
migration from north to south.
As is now widely recognized, the cost of unifying the two
German economies has turned out to be much more than expected:
between 1989 and 1992 East Germany's manufacturing output decreased
by one-third and GDP and employment by one-half (Schmidt and Sander
1993, Siebert 1993). Of course, any structural change of that
magnitude is costly in terms of output and employment, but there
are reasons to believe that with better policies the cost of German
unification could have been less. It is thus Korea's fortune to
have the German experience to guide it as it prepares for its own
unification.
Sections II and III present a brief history of the
socialization process undertaken in North Korea since 1945 and the
system of allocation currently in place. It should be noted herethat these two sections present only a sketchy outline of the North
Korean economy as very few data are available. The purpose of these
sections is to provide baseline information necessary for devising
measures for economic transition and integration. Section IV then
discusses some of the problems that will follow Korean unification;
specifically the method of privatization, the choice of the
conversion rate, and wage policy. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Socialization of Property in North Korea: A Brief History
Soon after the liberation of Korea from the Japanese colonial
occupation on August 15, 1945 the establishment of a socialist
economy began in the northern half of the Korean peninsular, [more
information on this for a Kiel working paper.] A series of reforms
was carried out, socializing the instruments and means of
production. These reforms included a major land reform; the
socialization of key industries, water and mineral resources; the
collectivization of agriculture; and the restructuring of
individual enterprises according to socialist economic principles.
As a result of these reforms, by 1958, state- and collective-
ownership became a dominant form of property ownership in the North
Korean economy.
(1). From Liberation to the Korean War: 1945-1950
On August 8, 1946 the Law of the Nationalization of Key
Industries was promulgated and the process of building a socialist
economy in North Korea began. It brought into state-ownership 1,034private enterprises, more than 90 percent of all the industries in
North Korea.
The Law of the Nationalization of Minerals, Forests, and Water
Bodies, which was promulgated on December 22, 1947, further
hastened the process of socializing industries and the means of
production. Thus, by the outbreak of the Korean War natural
resources such as minerals, forests, water bodies; social
infrastructure such as transportation and post and
telecommunications; and services such as banks, foreign trade,
cultural and entertainment activities had all been socialized and
had come under state planning.
The Law of Land Reform promulgated on March 5, 1946 authorized
the government to carry out a major land reform. The land that had
been owned by the Japanese and Korean absentee-landlords was
distributed to cultivators, and even some of the land owned by
"rich" farmers was redistributed to the cultivators with little or
no land. The effect of this land reform was to bring about an
equitable distribution of land. Thus, small-scale but private
ownership became the dominant form of landownership in North Korea.
As land was still owned privately by farmers the government
was not yet able to plan and control the development of the rural
economy in accordance with socialist economic principles. To
achieve its objectives, however, the government resorted to the
methods of indirect control'.
Farmers were supplied with the producer goods such as
agricultural machinery and fertilizers and the consumer goods suchas clothes at planned prices. In rural areas, however, small-scale
parallel markets for home-produced commodities were allowed to
exist, and on these markets prices were freely determined.
On May 20, 1946 a new trading organization owned and operated
by collectives was established in rural areas, and it brought about
a significant change in the way that commodities were distributed
to farmers.
Before the Korean War, private enterprises played a relatively
important role in retail trade in the urban area with the state-
owned stores and co-operatives accounting for only 3.5 percent of
total retail sales in 1946. In August 1946 the government
established a state-owned trade organization. The number of stores
belonging to that system was 104 in 1947 and it increased to 275 by
the middle of 1948. By 1949 the state-owned trade organization
accounted for 56.5 percent of retail trade and became a dominant
channel for commodity distribution throughout the country.
(2). Post-Korean War Period: 1953-1958
In 1953, when the Korean War ended with a cease-fire
agreement, the North Korean government undertook several major
changes to bring about further socialization of the economy. One of
these was to transform privately owned small-scale farms into co-
operative agricultural farms.
In North Korea, industry was regarded as the leading sector
with agriculture performing basically a supportive role of
providing food, raw materials, and labor for industrial expansion.The system of privately-owned, small-scale farms was found,
however, unable to perform this function adequately. Thus, in 1955
the process of building agricultural co-operatives and transforming
privately-owned, small-scale farms into socialist collectives began
throughout the country. This process was completed by August 1958.
While collectivization was taking place in rural North Korea,
self-employed and individually-owned industrial and commercial
enterprises were also being transformed into state-owned
enterprises. By 1958, the socialization of privately-owned
businesses was completed and all the self-employed, hand-craft
producers and private industrial and commercial enterprises were
converted into collective ownership.
Thus, by 1958 every sector of the North Korean economy—
industry, agriculture and commerce—became socialistic, and the
foundation for a centrally planned development of a socialist
economy was firmly in place.
III. System of Allocation in North Korea
The North Korean economy is a system of centralized planning,
implemented administratively through commands and extensive,
detailed instructions. Subordinates in this hierarchical
organization provide information and suggestions that may influence
planning and its implementation, but they are bound by commands
once they are issued. This highly centralized, hierarchical system
is in turn directed and controlled by the Communist Workers' Party.
It is, however, the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committeethat carries out the directives of the party through various
organizations in the central government as well as in the
provincial and local administrations.
The following presents in some detail the allocation systems
used in North Korea for natural resources, producer goods, and
consumer goods:
(1). Natural Resources
On December 22, 1947, with the Law of the Nationalization of
Mineral, Forest and Water Bodies the government established
socialist-ownership for all natural resources. Since then it has
controlled the prices and allocation of these resources (except for
land) in accordance with socialist economic principles.
The benchmark prices for coal and other minerals are set equal
to the production cost in the mines where production conditions are
least favorable and the cost is therefore the highest. This
practice guarantees that these mines make normal profit while those
with more favorable conditions generate rents, which belong to the
state, under a uniform price system. The prices of natural
resources do not, however, include the charge for using fixed
capital as it is not regarded as a cost. In terms of accounting
this practice does not make any difference as the rent is collected
by the state, but it leads to underpricing [in comparison with
what? the world price?] of natural resources and thus their overuse
by downstream industries.Soon after 1945 a policy of self-sufficiency in natural
resources was instituted for the purpose of better utilizing the
country's natural resources and building an independent economy.
As a result of that policy North Korea now provides over 75 percent
of the domestic demand for natural resources.
North Korea now has a comprehensive industrial system which
fully utilizes its natural resources. It has well-developed
industrial capabilities for ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fuel
and electric power, and chemicals. These capabilities have provided
an- impetus to the development of the machinery and construction
industries.
In allocating natural resources among various industries the
North Korean government has given priority to industry over
agriculture, heavy industry over light industry, excavation
industry over manufacturing, and industrial goods production over
consumer goods production. This priority system is based on the
socialist economic principle that the growth of industrial goods
production will lead to the development of the consumer goods
industry. This same principle has led to the priority of the heavy
industry in resource allocation, which is then expected to bring
about the development of the light industry and agriculture by
providing them with capital goods.
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In parallel with the strategy of heavy industrialization, the
government adopted a development policy for local industries. As
part of chuch'e (self-sufficiency) policy it encouraged the use of
locally available raw materials, fuels, and labor to meet the local
7demands for industrial goods such as textiles, food products and
other consumer goods (Merrill 1991). Thus, in developing industries
the North Korean government has used a dual approach of
centralization and decentralization.
(2). Producer Goods
Under the Law of the Nationalization of Key Industries issued
on August 10, 1946, over 90 percent of the extant enterprises was
transferred to state-ownership. In 1946, state-owned and
collective-owned enterprises produced 72.4 percent of the total
industrial output while private enterprises—mostly in light
industr-ies--produced 27.6 percent. In 1949, these percentages
changed to 90.7 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively, with state-
and collective-owned enterprises dominating every industry.
Until the beginning of the Korea War (1950-53), both
production and distribution of producer goods--capital and
intermediate goods—were basically controlled and planned by the
government. In early 1948, a new contract system was adopted and
producer goods began to be produced and distributed according to
supply contracts. This system ensured the supply of producer goods
to state-owned enterprises and restricted speculations by private
enterprises.
Under the system established soon after World War II each
province was in charge of providing enterprises with producer
goods. There was no agency in the central government that was
responsible for the allocation of producer goods nationwide. As aresult, there was little co-ordination between provinces in the
production and distribution of producer goods. This problem was
remedied with the introduction of the Dai-An allocation system in
the early 1960s.
The Dai-An system of allocation is a hierarchical system
consisting of one central state agency and a agency for each of the
provinces, localities, and enterprises. The state agency controls
the allocation of producer goods for the purpose of promoting
national economic development. The provincial agency is responsible
for ensuring the supply of production materials to the enterprises
within the province and distributing their products. The local
agency is responsible for allocating production materials to the
enterprises in its locality and distributing their products. The
functions of the enterprise agency, which is located within an
enterprise, are to ensure the supply of production materials needed
by the enterprise and thus free its managers for decisions relating
to production activities.
The strategy of the Dai-An system of allocation has been to
concentrate on investment in capital goods industries such as
engineering and heavy industries. The rationale for this is the
socialist principle that investment in the capital goods sector
expands the capital equipment of the consumer goods sector and
thereby its output. It should be noted, however, that behind this
strategy for heavy industrialization was the aim of establishing an
armaments industry (Merrill 1991).The success of heavy industrialization in North Korea came,
however, at a high cost; it came at the expense of light
manufacturing, agriculture and services. By 1989 this imbalance
became a major burden on the economy, and to correct it the
government designated 1989 as "the year of light industry",
adopting a three-year plan for the development of light
manufacturing industry. However, due to shortages of resources the
actual output of light manufactured goods seems to have fallen far
short of the planned target.
In North Korea, the capital goods that are exchanged between
state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises are
considered as commodities whereas those that are exchanged between
two state-owned enterprises are not. The reason for this is that
when capital goods are exchanged between state-owned enterprises
the transaction is merely a physical transfer without any change in
ownership as the parties to the exchange are all state-owned. For
the accounting purpose, however, such a transaction is recorded as
an exchange of commodity at a price set by the state. This price is
used by individual enterprises, which all have a "semi-independent
accounting system", in their cost calculation.
The price charged for a capital good is a "wholesale" price
set by the state. The wholesale price for exchange between state-
owned enterprises is computed by adding an average profit margin to
the original production cost, the profit here being only an
accounting concept. This price does not, however, fully reflect the
labor cost of production and in fact is lower than .the cost of
10production. This practice is of no consequence to the government
revenue since the exchange of capital goods is between state-owned
enterprises, but the underpricing of capital goods tends to bring
about the overuse of capital goods by state-owned enterprises.
- The same capital goods carry the same prices throughout the
entire country, but differences in price exist to reflect
differences in quality and to give an incentive for quality
improvement. The wholesale prices of capital goods are widely used
for accounting and as an instrument for improving management. They
are also used in calculating the gross output value of industry,
making plans, and predicting output growth.
Generally speaking, there are no retail prices for capital
goods in North Korea. When capital goods produced by state-owned
enterprises are transferred to collective-owned enterprises a price
called the supply price, which is different from the wholesale
price, is used. This price is computed by adding a profit margin
plus a commission to the original production cost. Capital goods
such as agricultural machinery are supplied to collective-owned
farms at supply prices.
(3). Consumer Goods
North Korea has established a socialist welfare society and
the pricing of consumer goods and their allocation are thus
determined in accordance with the principles of such a society.
Thus, most necessities such as food, housing, education and medical
11services are provided either at a subsidized price or free of
charge..
In 1946, state- and collective-owned trade organization were
established to improve the distribution of consumer goods and to
restrict speculative activities. These trade organizations now
exist throughout the country and are co-ordinated by a central
state organization.
In 1946 the percentage of socialized trade as a share of total
domestic retail trade was only 3.5 percent but it increased to 56.5
percent by 1949. In order to increase the socialized trade the
state supplied consumer goods to cities and country-side through
the socialized distribution network at prices lower than those
prevailing in free markets. To achieve further socialization the
government created in 1954 retail trade organizations, and in
August 1958 it succeeded in completely socializing the distribution
of consumer goods throughout the country.
The distribution of consumer goods is carried out jointly by
wholesale trade organizations managed by the central government and
retail trade organizations managed by local governments. Wholesale
trade organizations distribute the goods produced by enterprises to
retail trade organizations, and the latter in turn distribute them
to consumers through state-owned stores and farmers' markets.
North Korea maintains a contract system for consumer goods.
The retail trade organization estimates the consumer needs for
various commodities on the basis of information on sales,
inventories and market investigation. It then forwards-a request to
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a higher-level wholesale trade organization which in turn signs a
purchase contract with an enterprise. When the contracted commodity
is produced it is sent to the retail trade organization by way of
the wholesale trade organization. The retail trade organization
then distributes the commodity to the final consumers through
various stores.
In addition to the system of distribution described above,
there is another distribution system called a direct selling
system. Under this system enterprises producing light manufactured
goods may sell their products directly to final consumers without
going through the system of distribution described above.
The retail prices of most of the consumer goods are determined
by the state, which are equal to their whole prices plus value
added in distribution. Although the price is based on the value of
socially necessary labor embodied in the commodity it also reflects
changes in supply and demand. Thus, for certain commodities prices
can vary depending on the season even though they are uniform
throughout the entire country.
For commodities such as food and fuels supplied for home use,
food supplied to deep-sea fishermen, and food and school clothes
and text books supplied to children, special prices called the
"supply prices" apply. These prices are lower than the retail
prices, and the difference in price is borne by the state.
The farmers' market is a specially designated place where
collective farms and farmers with sideline production can sell part
of their agricultural and livestock products. Although prices are
13freely determined by supply and demand on these markets,
fluctuations in price are circumscribed due to the availability of
substitute goods supplied through the state-owned distribution
channels.
In 1950, the government formulated the Regulation on the
Farmers' Market, which stipulated that each county ("koon")
establish one or two farmers' markets to be held three times a
month. The value of trade on these markets accounted for 11 percent
of the country's total retail trade in 1949, decreasing to a little
over 5 percent in 1956 and then disappearing completely in the
1960s. In 1969 farmers' markets re-opened, and since 1984 every
district in Pyongyang and Chungjin have farmers' markets.
Much of the trade that takes place on the farmers' market is
legal, but some of the transactions are illegal. These illicit
activities may involve, among others, theft of socialist
properties, use of company time for private activity, illegal
production such as engaging in prohibited trade, and corruption.
IV. Issues in Transition and Economic Union
Since the mid-1980s North Korea has carried out various
reforms to correct the problems typical of centrally planned
socialist economies such as the soft budget constraint and
ineffective worker incentive provisions. These reforms have
included a new emphasis on financial accountability and relative
autonomy of state-owned enterprises and the promotion of foreign
direct investment and the nonstate sector in the consumer goods and
14service industries. If the Chinese experience with similar reforms
is anything to go by, the North Korean reforms are, however, bound
to fail. The problems have arisen from the contradictions inherent
to the centrally planned socialist system and cannot be thus
corrected without fundamental changes in the property system and
incentive structure (Kang and Lee 1992).
Given the unlikelihood of minor reforms being successful in
North Korea, the most likely path to unification will be through
the eventual collapse of the system described above. Unification
will then require the transformation of the socialist system of
allocation in the north into a market system and its integration
with the system in the south.
The transition from a centrally planned socialist economy to
a market economy requires more than dismantling the socialist
system. In its place a market system has to be deliberately
introduced. Market institutions have to be established but doing so
will be a costly, time-consuming process as evidenced in the
Eastern European countries (Winiecki 1992).
If unification on the Korean peninsular is a matter subject to
control, its optimal path would be first to transform the North
Korean economy into a viable market economy and then to bring about
its union with the South Korean economy. This may be, however,
impossible for political reasons and, as in the case of Germany,
there may be no alternative to big-bang unification.
If the German experience of unification is an indication of
the problems that North Korea will face, it will initially suffer
15severe output and employment contraction. Such severe contraction
in the economy may be an unavoidable cost of a radical structural
change, not limited to the transition from a Soviet-type centrally
planned to a market economy. In fact, the post-World War II
conversion of a war-time to a peace-time economy in the United
States also brought about a contraction in output and employment no
less severe in magnitude than that suffered by East Germany. Its
industrial production decreased by roughly 4 0 percent between the
fourth quarter of 1944 and the first quarter of 1946, and
employment fell by 30 percent between the first quarter of 1944 and
the fourth quarter of 1945 (Schatz and Schmidt 1992) .
In the case of East Germany the severity of its economic
contraction may have been, however, affected by three policy
decisions carried out at the time of unification. These are (1) the
method of privatizing state- and collective-owned properties, (2)
the choice of the conversion rate between the two currencies, and
(3) wage policy. If there is any lesson to be learned from the
German experience, it will be that Korea should be better prepared
to deal with these three policy decisions.
(1). Privatization
One of the first things that need to be done in North Korea in
the process of its transformation is the privatization of most, if
not all, of state-owned enterprises and collective farms. The
German experience of privatization points out that although
privatizing small-scale enterprises, especially in the service
16sector, is relatively easy there are several obstacles to
privatizing large state-owned industrial enterprises. First of all,
many of these enterprises are overstaffed and have poor
performance. Furthermore, the claims of dispossessed previous
owners and the lack of capital market institutions hinder quick
privatization (Schmieding 1992).
Uncertainty regarding the property right (ownership) has been
identified as a main cause for lack of investment and, worse, for
depletion of the existing assets in eastern Germany (Sinn 1992).
The establishment of a clear ownership title can be, however, a
costly process. Some of the reasons for that are the difficulty in
distinguishing between the ownership of a firm and the ownership of
land, incomplete and neglected records, the administrative
bottleneck in processing claims applications (1.2 million
applications in the case of Germany), and multiple ownership claims
when a firm has added pieces of land and buildings over time
(Siebert 1991) .
In Germany, until March 1991 any attempts at privatization by
the Treuhandanstalt was frozen whenever claims by previous owners
were announced.
3 A decision on 23 April 1991 by the German
Constitution Court has reduced, but not eliminated, the role of
restitution by making the ruling that restitution does not have to
be the only solution for expropriation that took place after 1949.
The decision has thus separated in principle the issue of the
claims of dispossessed previous owners from the issue of
compensation.
17State-Owned Enterprises
-Privatizing large state-owned industrial enterprises in North
Korea will also certainly run into various obstacles. But it is
likely to be less of a problem than for Germany as most of the
1,034 private enterprises that were nationalized in 1946 had
belonged to Japanese and there will be therefore fewer ownership
disputes over these properties. Many of the enterprises that were
established after 194 6 were probably created by the state or local
authorities, and there would not be many claims for restitution or
compensation. But even in these cases potential disputes can arise
regarding the ownership of the land on which a state-owned
enterprise was established. If the German experience is any guide
to privatization, Korea should from early on establish
compensation, not restitution, as a general rule for solving the
problem of ownership in North Korea.
With this issue of ownership settled, privatization is then a
matter of choosing between the sales and give-away approach. The
German Treuhand approach is basically a sales approach although it
is additionally burdened with the task of restructuring the
enterprises to be privatized, whereas the voucher scheme used in
the former Czechoslovakia is a give-away approach.
In deciding which approach to privatization to use Korea may
consider the three criteria proposed by Blanchard and Layard
(1992)--speed, fairness, and efficient control.
Clearly, speed is an important factor in privatization. As
pointed out by Blanchard and Layard, speed hastens .arrival; it
18prevents reversal; it removes uncertainty; it protects the
government budget from being siphoned off to support inefficient
,firms; and it may help fairness by minimizing the danger of insider
privatization. Given that the Treuhandanstalt, which in effect
began privatizing East German assets in June 1990, still has some
assets to privatize (as of August 1993), one can easily conclude
that for speedy privatization the give-away approach is superior to
the sales approach.
^ To achieve fairness in privatization, i.e., a fair
distribution of the assets of state-owned enterprises, Blanchard
and Layard advocate giving them away via a distribution of shares
or vouchers to the citizens preferably in equal amounts to all,
including children.
An additional argument in favor of give-away is that sales
would favor the former nomenklatura as they are the ones with
liquid assets and can thus purchase the usually undervalued assets
in the transition economy. But in the case of Korea it is likely
that a majority of north Korean assets will be purchased by South
Korean residents and businesses and not by the North Korean
nomenklatura. Furthermore, with the inflow of money and businesses
from the south it is unlikely that assets will remain undervalued
for long in north Korea once privatization begins. Fairness can be
then achieved by a distribution of privatization proceeds among the
North Koreans.
In considering fairness in the context of Korea we need to pay
attention to the issue of a regional balance between north and
19south. If most of the North Korean assets are purchased by South
Koreans and sales revenues are distributed to the North Koreans,
the pattern of social structure that will emerge in northern Korea
will be a dualistic one consisting of southern "capitalists" and
northern workers. In a society where for more than forty years
capitalists have been pictured as exploiters of the working class,
economically prosperous southern "capitalists" would be an object
of envy and hatred especially if unification brings about
contraction in output and employment in the north as severe as that
in eastern Germany. Given the fractious regionalism that Korea has
suffered in its long history, the fairness issue should not be
confined only to that of who among the North Koreans gets the
assets.but to that of whether assets in the north will become to be
controlled predominantly by the South Koreans.
This issue of a regional balance strengthens the argument in
favor of a give-away scheme. A free distribution of shares or
vouchers would give the North Koreans a clear title to properties
in the north and, with a proper education, a sense of being
themselves capitalists. Certainly there will be some who would like
to sell their shares or vouchers to increase their current
consumption. Trading in shares or vouchers can be, however,
justifiably prevented for a year or so until the North Koreans
become better informed of the nature of vouchers and shares and of
the workings of the capitalist market economy, especially the
workings of the stock market. Lack of such knowledge clearly
constitutes a case of market imperfection especially in an economy
20where people have lived in a centrally planned economy. In such a
situation the banning of trading in vouchers or shares for a year
or so, except in the way proposed below, seems fully warranted on
the basis of equity as well as economic efficiency.
The third criterion for privatization is efficient control of
assets. On this criterion the sales approach is superior to a free
distribution of shares or vouchers as it is simple in
administration and leads to good corporate governance. The voucher
system has some serious drawbacks in efficiency as the share
ownership will be widely diffused among a large number of people
and consequently the interest of owners cannot be adequately
protected.
As a way of getting around these drawbacks Blanchard and
Lanyard propose mutual funds or holding companies which will have
a majority ownership in a certain number of enterprises. Citizens
will then be given shares in each of these mutual funds or holding
companies.
There are, however, problems in trying to impose efficient
control over assets through mutual funds. To prevent possible fraud
the mutual funds will need to be supervised by the government, but
then privatization may turn out to be only in namesake as it is
still the government that will be managing the enterprises through
the mutual funds (Schmieding 1992) . But, a more basical question is
whether the mutual funds are the best instrument through which the
enterprises can be efficiently managed.
21Given that in the case of Korea the influx of money and
businesses from south will minimize the possibility of undervaluing
the North Korean assets a combination of sales and give-away may be
the best alternative for privatization. This combined scheme, which
takes into account some of the lessons from the German
privatization experience (Schatz 1992), may work in the following
manner:
The government establishes an independent institution, a trust
fund, to which all the properties to be privatized are transferred.
A controlling share in each of the enterprises to be privatized is
then sold to an investor (an individual or a firm) who offers the
highest price. The investor will be then in control of the
enterprise and thus in charge of necessary restructuring.
Vouchers, which are claims against the trust fund, are given
to every North Korean in an equal amount and are to be exchanged
for shares in a special account to be established in every mutual
fund currently in operation in South Korea. This special account is
only for the North Koreans with its assets consisting solely of the
shares in the former North Korean state-owned enterprises.
The vouchers are to be exchanged for shares in one or several
mutual funds. They will be then used by the mutual funds to bid for
the remaining shares in the privatized enterprises yet held by the
trust fund.
In this process of privatization, three competitive markets
will emerge: (1) a market for the controlling shares in the
enterprises being privatized by the trust fund, (2) a market for
22the vouchers held by the North Koreans in exchange for shares in
the mutual funds, and (3) a market for the remaining shares held by
the trust fund in exchange for the vouchers now held by the mutual
funds.
As a result of privatization, a North Korean will typically
find himself with cash from the trust fund and shares in a mutual
fund. The price of the share will be, however, in terms of the
voucher and is unlikely to have a market value convertible into
cash for a while. Only when the mutual fund has used all of its
vouchers to acquire some of the remaining shares held by the trust
fund will there be cash offers for the shares of the mutual fund.
Only then will North Koreans be able to convert their shares into
cash.
Given the great uncertainty regarding the viability of many of
the newly privatized enterprises, as evidenced in the case of East
Germany (International Herald Tribune, July 12, 1993), it may be
economically rational to ban trading in shares in the mutual funds
for a year or two. Such time may be needed for the necessary
restructuring by the privatized firms and for corresponding
portfolio adjustment by the mutual funds. A management-fee schedule
directly proportional to the price of the share will give the
mutual fund a strong incentive to maximize the value of its
portfolio for the time when trading in shares will be allowed.
The process of privatization outlined above will be rapid as
the trust fund functions solely as a privatizing agency not
involved in the restructuring task. It has the advantage of putting
23the privatized enterprise under the direct control of a single
individual or firm. It also has the advantage of turning the North
Koreans into "capitalists" (for some at least for a short period of
time until they sell their mutual fund shares). It transfers the
task of evaluating privatized enterprises from North Korean
individuals to the mutual funds; it is far easier for the North
Koreans to shop around for a mutual fund with a track record to
show than for a proper mix of shares in the enterprises just
recently privatized. The trust will be dissolved once the shares
held by it_ are exchanged for vouchers offered by the mutual funds
by a certain future date.
Collective Farms
Four types of land ownership will have to be dealt with in
privatizing the collective farms in North Korea. The first is the
ownership of the land that belonged to the Japanese colonialists
until 1945; the second the ownership of the land that was
expropriated from "rich" or absentee Korean landowners under the
1946 Law of Land Reform; the third the ownership of the land that
was distributed to cultivators under the same law and held by them
until 1958 when collectivization was completed; and the fourth the
ownership of the land that was held by small cultivators until
1958.
In the first case, neither compensation nor restitution to the
former Japanese landowners will be necessary. In the second case,
restitution to previous owners would be unnecessary given that
24similar land reforms redistributing land from absentee landowners
to cultivators had been also carried out in the south. Compensation
will have to be made, however, for the land that was expropriated
in 1946 and its primary purpose would be to reaffirm the principle
of private property in the unified Korea. Since these so-called
"rich" or absentee landowners are probably no longer alive,
compensation may be made in nominal sums to their descendants who
now reside in the south. In the third case—the ownership of land
given to cultivators in 1946 but later turned into collective
farms—restitution may be a preferred solution as the land reform
of 1946 was not probably that different, except for the matter of
compensation, from the land reforms carried out in the south. In
the fourth case, the matter is straightforward as the land should
be restituted to the previous owners. (The farmers who receive land
will have to be disqualified from receiving cash and vouchers from
the trust fund.)
The above method of privatizing the collective farms will in
effect re-establish the pattern of landownership--"Land to the
tiller"--brought about by the 1946 Law of Land Reform. It may be,
however, no longer appropriate in Korea where industrialization has
so altered its economic structure that agriculture accounts for a
relatively small share of GDP. In such a case it may be more
rational to make no distinction between collective farms and state-
owned industrial enterprises and between farmers and industrial,
workers. Collective farms will then be privatized by the trust fund
in the same manner as state-owned enterprises.
25Bottom-Up Privatization
The ultimate purpose of privatizing state-owned enterprises
and collective farms is to transform the North Korean economy into
a market system. Privatization of the state-owned enterprises—top
down privatization--is in fact only one of the twin privatization
processes that must take place in transforming the North Korean
economy. The other process is bottom-up privatization, i.e., the
expansion of the private sector as new private enterprises become
established in a former socialist economy.
Bottom-up privatization will take place with direct
investments from the south and the rest of the world as well as
with investments by some North Koreans. These will be, however, in
a handicapped position as, having lived in a socialist planned
economy, they would lack the necessary knowhow and even the
inclination for entrepreneurial activities and the access to credit
necessary for investment. Thus, to achieve a tolerable regional
balance in bottom-up privatization it may be necessary to establish
specialized financial institutions that would for a short period of
time allocate subsidized credit only to the North Koreans.
(2). Choice of the Conversion Rate
How economic union will affect the enterprises in North Korea
and thus their output and employment will depend on the conversion
rate between the North Korean currency and the South Korean won. At
a conversion rate favorable to the former—an overvaluation of the
North Korean currency--the wage rate for North Korean labor will be
26higher in terms of the won than at a less favorable rate. Given
their generally low productivity due to "overstaffing" and obsolete
technology that is typical of enterprises in a socialist economy,
a favorable conversion rate will have an adverse effect on the
competitiveness of North Korean enterprises and will thus bring
about a contraction in their output and employment.
4
Furthermore, whatever the conversion rate may be, economic
union will put North Korean enterprises at a competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis South Korean firms as the latter would
probably have better products to compete with.
5 Consequently,
North Korean enterprises will suffer contraction in demand for
their products, and a favorable conversion rate will simply make
the matter worse for them.
In Germany, the Treaty on German Economic, Monetary and Social
Union of July 1, 1990 established the Deutsche Mark as the only
currency and the Deutsche Bundesbank as the only central bank in
the unified Germany. It also transferred all the civil, commercial
and public laws of West Germany to East Germany and set a
conversion rate averaging 1.81 ostmark for one Deutsche mark.
6
All contracts concerning the current income were converted at
a rate of 1:1. This impacted adversely overnight the profitability
of the East German enterprises. A conversion rate significantly
below that would have been necessary to render East German firms
viable, but then eastern wages would have been less than one third
of West German wages (Schmidt and Sander 1993) . At that difference
in wages there could have been a mass exodus from East to West
27Germany although, according to a survey of East Germans, it is the
lack of work for a sufficiently long period, not wage
differentials, that would induce them to migrate to West Germany
(Akerlof et al. 1991).
In the final analysis, however, one is led to the conclusion
that what determined the conversion rate was not economic
rationality but political imperative of unification (Hasse 1993) .
The conversion rate determined the extent of income and wealth
transfer from West to East Germany, which was a matter of political
decision, and a favorable term of conversion might have been
necessary to get enough East German votes for unification.
Furthermore, it would be have been symbolically unacceptable to
have maintained two different currencies for the newly unified
Germany.
(3). Wage Policy
What made the contraction in output and employment worse in
east Germany was a wage cost explosion which far exceeded the
market-clearing level (Akerlof et al.).
7 Starting even before the
currency union, wages began to rise in anticipation of the
favorable terms of conversion. As a matter of fact, between the
fourth quarter of 1989 and the second quarter of 1990 wages rose by
20 percent (Schmidt and Sander 1993).
The workforce in the old socialist firms and the trade
unions, which had spread quickly from West to East Germany, pressed
for higher wage contracts. The old socialist management did not
28resist the pressure for higher wages and moreover had every
incentive to agree to the demands of the workforce in the hope of
gaining its goodwill (Schatz and Schmidt 1992). In other words,
during the transition from a centrally planned to a markety economy
the interest of the owners was not adequately represented at the
wage bargaining table. There was not even a soft budget constraint
on the demands by the management and labor as the government
completely abstained itself from wage negotiations.
The opportunistic behavior of the workforce and management of
the old socialist enterprises was further abetted by the self-
interest of both West German trade unions and employers
associations. As they saw it, low East German wages would have put
downward pressure on West German wages and would have given new or
restructured enterprises in eastern Germany a competitive edge
against the established firms in western Germany. Thus, from the
very beginning West German unions and employers associations
supported their East German counterparts in the determination of
wages (Bofinger and Cernohorsky 1992).
As a way of preserving existing jobs and speeding new job
creation Akerlof et al. proposed a program of "self-eliminating
flexible employment bonuses." This would presumably have eliminated
the gap between the high private cost of labor caused by high
Eastern wages and the low marginal product of East German labor. As
pointed out, however, by Schmidt and Naujoks (1993) , such a scheme
would have discriminated against viable East German enterprises,
would not have given adequate incentives for adjustment, and could
29have easily degenerated into a self-perpetuating mechanism for
subsidies.
Clearly, given that the absence of the ownership interest at
the wage bargaining table was a major cause for the wage cost
explosion in East Germany, rapid privatization would have had a
dampening effect by firmly establishing the ownership right. The
lesson for Korea is clear: it should carry out privatization as
quickly as possible, and in the cases where that is not possible
the government should represent the ownership and act firmly in its
interest. It might even consider adopting some form of incomes
policy during the transition period.
V. Conclusion
A conversion rate economically more rational than 1:1 and
modest wages increases would have somewhat eased the cost of
structural change for the East German economy. It would not,
however, have avoided the cost entirely since the demand for its
inferior products would have decreased once western goods became
available to the East Germans. This cost--temporary de-
industrialization of the East German economy—was an unavoidable
cost of a closed, inferior economy being integrated overnight into
an open market economy. Getting the prices right, i.e., a correct
conversion rate and correct wage rates, would not have been enough
to prevent the cost of such a radical structural change.
In preparing itself for its eventual unification Korea needs
devise a method for rapid and efficient privatization and set the
30right conversion rate and wage policy. But these would not be
enough as the two economies on the Korean peninsular are too
disparate for painless integration. In addition, there must be a
comprehensive regional development plan that can help make the
privatized enterprises viable, create new enterprises, and create
employment. Such a plan will include plans for transferring market
institutions from the south and developing human capital that can
effectively function with these institutions. These tasks cannot
be, however, left alone to the market but will have to be carried
out by the government. The transformation of the centrally planned
economy in the north into a market economy and its integration with
the economy in the south will thus require, ironic it may be, an
active role by the government.
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34Endnotes
1. Since the mid-1980s North Korea has carried out various
reforms to correct the problems typical of centrally planned
socialist economies such as the soft budget constraint and
ineffective worker incentive provisions. If the Chinese experience
with similar reforms is anything to go by, the North Korean reforms
are, however, bound to fail (Kang and Lee 1992) . It is assumed
here, given the unlikelihood of minor reforms being successful in
North Korea, that the most likely path to unification will be
through the eventual collapse of its economy.
2. It should be noted that North Korea followed the Soviet Union
and China in adopting the strategy of heavy industrialization for
economic development. This strategy, however, had the effect of
shifting labor and materials away from agriculture, small-scale
industry, and services and thus retarded their development.
3. The Treaty on German Economic, Monetary and Social Union of
July 1, 1990, which formalized the economic union of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, established
the Treuhandanstalt ("trust fund") to help privatize the state-
owned enterprises while restructuring and supporting them
temporarily.
4. If wages were completely flexible, the choice of the
conversion rate would not matter as wages will adjust to their
equilibrium level after the economic union. This seems to be,
however, an unlikely scenario.
355. After the currency union East Germans almost completely
stopped buying East German goods; since 1991 imports of East
Germany have exceeded private consumption (Bofinger and Cernohorsky
1992) .
6. The main conversion rates agreed upon in the Treaty on the
Creation of a Monetary, Economic and Social Union between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
(approved by both parliaments 20 September 1990) are:
a. Salaries, retiring pensions and housing rents 1:1
b. Credits of enterprises and individuals 2:1
c. Liabilities of enterprises and individuals 2:1
d. Savings of citizens of the GDR up to certain amounts depending
on their ages 1:1
e. All savings above these ceilings and cash 2:1
f. Claims of individuals living outside the GDR 3:1.
The average conversion rate calculated by the Deutsche
Bundesbank is 1:1.81 (Hasse 1993).
7. A secondary reason is a sharp drop in demand for east German
goods as west German goods became available to east Germans and as
exports to CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries
declined drastically.
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